

JOE GRAND AKA KINGPIN


THAT TIME I HACKED A HARDWARE
WALLET AND RECOVERED \$2 MILLION...

THIS IS A TRUE STORY


"I'M REACHING OUT BECAUSE OF AN ISSUE I HAVE WITH MY TREZOR WALLET. IN 2017, I BOUGHT SOME CRYPTO AND HAVEN'T TOUCHED THE WALLET SINCE. WHEN I WAS MOVING EARLIER THIS YEAR, I THINK THAT I ACCIDENTALLY THREW OUT THE RECOVERY SEED."



Re-enter PIN
for Trezor

 The key layout on your Trezor has
changed!

Example





•	•	•
•	•	•
•	•	•

The PIN you have entered is strong enough!

(Max. 9 digits)

Enter PIN

Not sure how PIN works? [Learn more](#)




HARDWARE HACKING

PROCESS

- **Information Gathering**
 - Obtain information about the target
- **Teardown**
 - Product disassembly, component/subsystem ID
- **Buses & Interfaces**
 - Signal monitoring/analysis/emulation/fault injection
- **Memory & Firmware**
 - Extract/modify/analyze/reprogram code or data
- **Chip-Level**
 - Silicon die modification/data extraction

MICROCONTROLLER SECURITY

- Protects MCU internal memory, debug interfaces
- Vendor-specific implementations
 - May require fuse/register setting, password, challenge/response
 - Reduce access (allow subset of functionality)
 - "Permanently" disable access
- Configured/checked during chip boot process




Arm[®]-based 32-bit MCU, 150 DMIPs, up to 1 MB Flash/128+4KB RAM, USB OTG HS/FS, Ethernet, 17 TIMs, 3 ADCs, 15 comm. interfaces and camera

Datasheet - production data


Features

- Core: Arm[®] 32-bit Cortex[®]-M3 CPU (120 MHz max) with Adaptive real-time accelerator (ART Accelerator™) allowing 0-wait state execution performance from Flash memory, MPU, 150 DMIPS/1.25 DMIPS/MHz (Dhrystone 2.1)
- Memories
 - Up to 1 Mbyte of Flash memory
 - 512 bytes of OTP memory
 - Up to 128 + 4 Kbytes of SRAM
 - Flexible static memory controller that supports Compact Flash, SRAM, PSRAM, NOR and NAND memories
 - LCD parallel interface, 8080/6800 modes
- Clock, reset and supply management
 - From 1.8 to 3.6 V application supply + I/Os
 - POR, PDR, PVD and BOR
 - 4 to 26 MHz crystal oscillator
 - Internal 16 MHz factory-trimmed RC
 - 32 kHz oscillator for RTC with calibration
 - Internal 32 kHz RC with calibration
- Low-power modes
 - Sleep, Stop and Standby modes
 - V_{BAT} supply for RTC, 20 × 32 bit backup registers, and optional 4 Kbytes backup SRAM
- 3 × 12-bit, 0.5 μs ADCs with up to 24 channels and up to 6 MSPS in triple interleaved mode
- 2 × 12-bit D/A converters
- General-purpose DMA: 16-stream controller with centralized FIFOs and burst support
- Up to 17 timers
 - Up to twelve 16-bit and two 32-bit timers, up to 120 MHz, each with up to four IC/OC/PWM or pulse counter and quadrature (incremental) encoder input
- Debug mode: Serial wire debug (SWD), JTAG, and Cortex[®]-M3 Embedded Trace Macrocell™
- Up to 140 I/O ports with interrupt capability:
 - Up to 136 fast I/Os up to 60 MHz
 - Up to 138 5 V-tolerant I/Os
- Up to 15 communication interfaces
 - Up to three I²C interfaces (SMBus/PMBus)
 - Up to four USARTs and two UARTs (7.5 Mbit/s, ISO 7816 interface, LIN, IrDA, modem control)
 - Up to three SPIs (30 Mbit/s), two with muxed I²S to achieve audio class accuracy via audio PLL or external PLL
 - 2 × CAN interfaces (2.0B Active)
 - SDIO interface
- Advanced connectivity
 - USB 2.0 full-speed device/host/OTG controller with on-chip PHY
 - USB 2.0 high-speed/full-speed device/host/OTG controller with dedicated DMA, on-chip full-speed PHY and ULPI
 - 10/100 Ethernet MAC with dedicated DMA: supports IEEE 1588v2 hardware, MII/RMII
- 8- to 14-bit parallel camera interface (48 Mbyte/s max.)
- CRC calculation unit
- 96-bit unique ID



RDP transition scheme

10




- Level 0
 - Option byte mods are allowed
 - Can transition to Level 1 or Level 2
- Level 1
 - Option byte mods are allowed.
 - Can transition to Level 0 or Level 2
 - Level 0 → Mass erase of user Flash memory, backup regs and SRAM2
- Level 2
 - Option bytes are frozen
 - No transition possible

FAULT INJECTION

- Intentionally cause a fault in the target device
 - System reset/halt
 - Change in software decision
 - Skip an instruction
 - Affect branching
 - Computational fault
 - Instruction decoding errors
 - Malformed data read/write

FAULT INJECTION

FIGURE 17-2: PIC16LF627A/628A/648A VOLTAGE-FREQUENCY GRAPH, $-40^{\circ}\text{C} \leq \text{TA} \leq +85^{\circ}\text{C}$



Note: The shaded region indicates the permissible combinations of voltage and frequency.

FAULT INJECTION

- Requires precise tuning to determine ideal glitch parameters
 - When to glitch?
 - Width of pulse?
 - Target preparation often needed
- Usually triggered by external indicator or cycle counting
 - Based on a known bus/signal output
 - May require firmware/code analysis
- Not a persistent attack (need to perform each time)

INSPIRATION



wallet.fail


Thomas Roth, Dmitry Nedospasov, Josh Datko

9563


The image features a dense, intricate network of glowing blue lines and nodes, creating a sense of a complex data network or server infrastructure. The lines are of varying thickness and brightness, with some appearing as thick, bright blue beams and others as thinner, dimmer connections. The nodes are small, glowing points of light, some in blue and others in green or red, scattered throughout the network. The overall color palette is dominated by deep blues and teals, with occasional highlights of green and red. In the center of the image, the text "chip.fail" is displayed in a clean, white, sans-serif font. The background is dark, making the glowing network stand out prominently.

chip.fail


Bootrom Glitching







Power consumption after reset (200μs)






Power domains



TRIAL AND ERROR





*** CASE UPDATE NOTIFICATION ***

Dear Joe Grand,
Below case has been updated by ST Support.

Case#: 00128918

Subject: Product Information Letter or Silicon Changes

Status: Working

Description: www.st.com

Joe

For device revisions on any product, you can check the Errata for these details. They are located in the product 'Documentation' folder.


The Errata for the F2 can be found here: https://www.st.com/resource/en/errata_sheet/dm00027213-stm32f205207xx-and-stm32f215217xx-device-limitations-stmicroelectronics.pdf

STMicroelectronics is aware of the Kracken documents referring to the STM32F2. There was no revision done on the F2 in regards to fault injections.

**STM32F2
HAS NOT BEEN FIXED**

Yesterday 11:51 PM

oh shit i did it!



Delivered

Today 9:17 AM

Yay!!!!

```
ERROR:pylink.jlink.STM32: Connecting to CPU via connect under reset failed.  
a connect under reset failed.
```

```
ERROR:pylink.jlink.STM32: Connecting to CPU via connect under reset failed.  
a connect under reset failed.
```

```
ERROR:pylink.jlink.STM32: Connecting to CPU via connect under reset failed.  
a connect under reset failed.
```

```
2021-04-03 23:50:18.548042
```

```
Device ID: 0x4BA00477
```

```
successes = 1, resets = 0, repeat = 96, ext_offset = 30961
```

```
ERROR:pylink.jlink.STM32: Connecting to CPU via connect under reset failed.  
a connect under reset failed.
```

```
144 data2hex(storage_uuid, sizeof(storage_uuid), storage_uuid_str);
```

```
145
```

```
146 // copy storage
```

```
147 size_t old_storage_size = 0;
```

```
148
```

```
149 if (version == 1 || version == 2) {
```

```
150     old_storage_size = 460;
```

```
151 } else
```

```
152 if (version == 3 || version == 4 || version == 5) {
```

```
153     old_storage_size = 1488;
```

```
154 } else
```

```
155 if (version == 6 || version == 7) {
```

```
156     old_storage_size = 1496;
```

```
157 } else
```

```
158 if (version == 8) {
```

```
159     old_storage_size = 1504;
```

```
160 }
```

```
161
```

```
162 memset(&storage, 0, sizeof(Storage));
```

```
163 memcpy(&storage, (void *) (FLASH_STORAGE_START + 4 + sizeof(storage_uuid)), old_storage_size);
```

```
164
```

```
165 if (version <= 5) {
```

```
166     // convert PIN failure counter from version 5 format
```

```
167     uint32_t pinctr = storage.has_pin_failed_attempts
```

```
168         ? storage.pin_failed_attempts : 0;
```

```
169     if (pinctr > 31) {
```

```
170         pinctr = 31;
```

```
171     flash_clear_status_flags();
```

```
172     flash_unlock();
```

```
173     // erase extra storage sector
```

```
174     flash_erase_sector(FLASH_META_SECTOR_LAST, FLASH_CR_PROGRAM_X32);
```

```
175     flash_program_word(FLASH_STORAGE_PINAREA, 0xffffffff << pinctr);
```

```
176     flash_lock();
```

```
177     storage_check_flash_errors();
```


METADATA (INCL. SEED + PIN)




CHIPWHISPERER




PHYWHISPERER




SEGGER J-LINK







TREZOR HW 1.1



STM32F205R6T6



THE REAL DEAL








DC


27



HODL

Property of
GRAND 00153

SlickVis







Agilent Technologies

InfiniVision

0.0s 1.000 μ s/ Trig'd?

1 2.00V/ 2 2.00V/ 3 500ns/ 4

3V3

V CORE

NRST

$\Delta X = 150.96000\mu s$
Mode Normal

Coupling DC

$1/\Delta X = 6.6243kHz$
Noise Rej

HF Reject

$\Delta Y(1) = 0.0V$
Holdoff 60ns

Trigger
Mode
Pulse Width
Pattern
File
Save Recall
Print
Auto Scale

Waveform
Acquire
Display
Intensity
Quick Meas

Vertical
1
2
3
Math

AC
DC
1 M Ω 10pF
300 V CAT I





Home Page - Select or create x Tribble - Jupyter Notebook x +

http://localhost:8888/notebooks/Tribble.ipynb

jupyter Tribble Last Checkpoint: 5 hours ago (unsaved changes) Python 3

File Edit View Insert Cell Kernel Widgets Help Trusted Python 3

Run

```
ERROR:pylink.jlink:STM32: Connecting to CPU via connect under reset failed.
ERROR:pylink.jlink:STM32: Connecting to CPU via connect under reset failed.
ERROR:pylink.jlink:STM32: Connecting to CPU via connect under reset failed.
ERROR:pylink.jlink:STM32: Connecting to CPU via connect under reset failed.
ERROR:pylink.jlink:STM32: Connecting to CPU via connect under reset failed.
ERROR:pylink.jlink:STM32: Connecting to CPU via connect under reset failed.
```

Step 2: Extract RAM Contents

On Trezor One firmware versions <= 1.6.0, the critical metadata (recovery seed + PIN) are stored in RAM on power-up. We can now use OpenOCD to extract the contents.

```
In [9]: 1 # Close PyLink to give control of Segger back to OS
        2 jlink.close()

In [10]: 1 # Launch OpenOCD to extract RAM
         2 # openocd -f interface/jlink.cfg -c "transport select swd" -f target/stm32f2x.cfg -c "init" -c "dump_image SRAM.bin"
         3 result = subprocess.run(['openocd', '-f', 'openocd_swd_trezor.cfg'], capture_output=True, text=True)
         4 print(result.stderr)
```

```
Open On-Chip Debugger 0.11.0-rc2+dev-00006-gf68ade529-dirty (2021-02-03-18:32)
Licensed under GNU GPL v2
For bug reports, read
  http://openocd.org/doc/doxygen/bugs.html
Info : J-Link V9 compiled Dec 13 2019 11:14:50
Info : Hardware version: 9.30
Info : VTarget = 3.319 V
Info : clock speed 1000 kHz
Info : SWD DPIDR 0x2ba01477
Info : stm32f2x.cpu: hardware has 6 breakpoints, 4 watchpoints
Error: stm32f2x.cpu -- clearing lockup after double fault
Polling target stm32f2x.cpu failed, trying to reexamine
Info : stm32f2x.cpu: hardware has 6 breakpoints, 4 watchpoints
Info : starting gdb server for stm32f2x.cpu on 3333
Info : Listening on port 3333 for gdb connections
```

```
In [ ]: 1 # Display any printable ASCII data within the extracted binary
        2 result = subprocess.run(['strings', 'SRAM.bin'], capture_output=True, text=True)
        3 print(result.stdout)
```



```
Info : stm32f2x.cpu: hardware has 6 breakpoints, 4 watchpoint  
Info : starting gdb server for stm32f2x.cpu on 3333  
Info : Listening on port 3333 for gdb connections
```

In [11]:

```
1 # Display any printable ASCII data within the extracted b  
2 result = subprocess.run(['strings', 'SRAM.bin'], capture_  
3 print(result.stdout)
```

```
12514  
jl trezor  
XXXXXXXXXX  
F74113D4B4F08319871F9120  
"2:.&
```



LESSONS LEARNED

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- General purpose MCU security is not always suitable

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- Fault injection is dependent on many external factors
 - Glitch "quality"
 - Glitch parameters (timing, width)
 - Temperature
 - Manufacturing variances in silicon

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- General purpose MCU security is not always suitable
- Fault injection is dependent on many external factors
 - Glitch "quality"
 - Glitch parameters (timing, width)
 - Temperature
 - Manufacturing variances in silicon
- When it works, it feels like magic

RESOURCES

- [Trezor](#)
- [wallet.fail](#) and [chip.fail](#)
- [Kraken Identifies Critical Flaw in Trezor Hardware Wallets](#)
- [Verifying Code Readout Protection Claims](#)
- [Shedding too much Light on a Microcontroller's Firmware Protection](#)
- [Trezor - security glitches reveal your private keys!](#)
- [Cracking a \\$2 million crypto wallet \(The Verge\)](#)
- [How I hacked a hardware crypto wallet and recovered \\$2 million \(YouTube\)](#)
- [offspec.io](#)

HACKED BY
JOE GRAND
\$KINGPIN\$